We also analyse two kinds of control, characterised by two different functions: 'pushing or influencing control' aimed at preventing violations or mistakes, Vs 'safety, correction or adjustment control' aimed at preventing failure or damages after a violation or a mistake. In conclusion, depending on the circumstances, control makes y more reliable or less reliable control can either decrease or increase trust. Finally, we show that paradoxically control could not be antagonistic of strict trust in y, but it can even create, increase it by making y more willing or more effective. We also argue that control requires new forms of trust: trust in the control itself or in the controller, trust in y as for being monitored and controlled trust in possible authorities etc. In other words, putting control and guaranties is trust-building it produces a sufficient trust, when trust in y's autonomous willingness and competence would not be enough. We claimed that control is antagonistic of this strict form of trust but also that it completes and complements it for arriving to a global trust.

However, this refers to a restricted notion of trust: i.e., 'trust in y', which is just a part, a component of the global trust needed for relying on the action of another agent.

On the one side, it is true that where/when there is control there is no trust, and vice versa. The relationship between trust and control is quite relevant both for the very notion of trust and for modelling and implementing trust-control relations with autonomous systems but it is not trivial at all.

Core components of a dialectic